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The hopes surrounding the entry strategy followed by 
Chilean winemakers in the United States market in 
the 1990s, which consisted in offering good wines at 
low prices, have given way 20 years on to a growing 
frustration. In the words of one of the best winegrowers 
in the industry: “Chilean wines are drunk essentially 
because they are cheap.”
If price is a signal of quality, it might be suggested 
that the strategy of entering the United States market with 
a large-scale, low-priced and relatively undifferentiated 
initial offering risks protracting indefinitely the period 
in which Chilean wine, having gained a reputation for 
cheapness, is penalized by consumers unwilling to pay 
the prices its sensory or objective quality merit.
Consumers are unlikely to discern the quality of 
an experience good like wine, particularly when it is 
produced in a little-known country like Chile. Instead, 
they tend to infer quality from the good’s price. The 
modest initial success of the Chilean strategy at a time 
when there were no cheap wines on the United States 
market, and the ensuing stagnation as other competitors 
(such as the South Africans and the Argentines) came in 
with even lower prices, are two developments that may 
be due to the same cause.
A number of organizations have argued for the 
need to speed up the differentiation of Chilean wine, 
and three approaches have been suggested for this: 
(i) creating a country image or brand that confers identity 
and enhances the value of the various wines produced 
in Chile, (ii) investing more in innovation and quality, 
as the Australians have done, and (iii) changing the 
expectations of United States consumers by producing 
world-class wines.
The aim of this study is to supply empirical evidence 
that can be used to assess the brand power of a country 
like Chile which is a new entrant in the market. Using 
the hedonic price method of Rosen (1974), it analyses 
how sensitive international wine prices are to indicators 
of quality and reputation. The study includes five cross-
sectional samples of five vintages between 1997 and 
2005, using indicators published by Wine Spectator for 
red wines produced in Argentina, Australia, the United 
States (Napa and Sonoma), Chile, France (Burgundy) 
and South Africa.
In public policy terms, the challenge for a new 
entrant country is to induce consumers to rate its different 
wines on their own merits (individual quality) rather than 
inferring their quality in a general way from its weak 
country image (collective reputation). This is not easy. 
According to Roberts and Reagans (2007), consumers 
are more comfortable assessing the best-known wines, 
such as those of France and California, than wines that 
are not well represented in the United States quality 
classification, such as those of Argentina, Chile and 
South Africa.
The findings of this study reveal that the problem 
will not be solved until the countries that have recently 
entered the industry, such as Chile and Argentina, produce 
a critical mass of wines of outstanding quality, which 
is what ultimately creates a good collective image or 
reputation for a country’s producers.
The marketing short cut of building image without 
quality does not work. Even when quality is heavily 
invested in, as has been done by the Australians, 
building up a reputation in the wine market is a slow 
and cumbersome process, particularly if the aim is to 
compete with French and Californian wines, which 
defined and shaped the cultural meaning of modern wine 
by constructing powerful and unique image associations. 
It is precisely this inertia that is responsible for the heavy 
price penalty still paid by Chilean and Argentine wines.
Nor are there any easy solutions to this inertia along 
the lines suggested by Gibbs, Tapia and Warzynski (2009), 
who argue that globalization and the unprecedented 
increase in products of non-traditional origin in the 
United States market have increased the proportion of 
consumers seeking more information on the objective 
quality of wine, thus enhancing the importance of the 
individual quality classifications published by specialist 
journals such as Wine Spectator. If this theory were 
correct, the price-quality elasticity of wines would be 
increasing and the country penalty paid by Chilean and 
Argentine wines would be decreasing over time. The 
findings of the present study provide evidence for the 
opposite: price-quality elasticity appears to have been 
stable over the 1997-2005 study period. The market still 
goes on reputation.
But the battle between the leading global brands 
may be an opportunity for the newcomers. The findings 
of this study show that France is losing brand power by 
comparison with California, and also relative to some 
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an abuse of reputation on the part of the dominant brand 
at the end of its cycle.
This article is organized as follows. Section II briefly 
reviews the literature. The stylized facts, drawing on 
indicators of wine quality and reputation by country of 
origin, are explained in section III. Section IV presents 
the empirical model and analyses the main findings. 
Lastly, section V summarizes the principal conclusions.
II 
image or quality?
In the wine market, better quality is no guarantee of a 
higher price. The relationship between price and quality 
depends more on consumers’ perceptions of the wine’s 
country of origin than on the individual quality of the 
product. According to the findings of Brooks (2003) 
on the basis of data from the United States market, any 
Chilean or Argentine winemaker can only charge half 
as much as a winemaker producing wine of the same 
quality in the Napa Valley of California.
As argued by Costanigro, McCluskey and 
Mittelhammer (2007), a country’s image is a kind of 
public good. The fate of any pioneering exporter from 
Chile trying to compete in the premium market in the 
United States or Europe will depend on the image that 
has been projected by Chilean wines as a whole, i.e., on 
what Tirole (1996) calls collective reputation.
In these circumstances, all the wines of a newcomer 
country, be they good or middling, are heavily penalized. 
The situation is particularly bad for the ambitions of 
winemakers from the New World. Landon and Smith 
(1998) highlight the fact that prices for wines from 
France (Bordeaux) in the United States market owe 20 
times as much to their past reputation as to their objective 
individual quality. Country images are slow to change, 
and there is a strong incentive for reputations to be 
abused—a commercial practice that will go unnoticed 
for a considerable time.
Following Tirole (1996) and Winfree and McCluskey 
(2005), we can understand a winemaking reputation as 
the accumulated prestige, renown and image associated 
with the name of a producer (individual reputation) or 
a group of producers (collective reputation) as a result 
of the quality history of their wines over a substantial 
period of time.
As Combris, Lecocq and Visser (1997) and Barber, 
Almanza and Donovan (2006) argue, the fact that wine 
is an experience good means that consumers are not 
able to distinguish its quality before trying it. It is the 
prestige associated with a region or country which 
assures consumers that wines from there are of a certain 
quality, and this country image can only be altered at the 
margins and very slowly by the entry of a few wines of a 
quality superior to that of the wines currently available.
According to Castriota and Delmastro (2008), 
consumers are willing to pay a price premium for this 
assurance, particularly if the region is world-renowned, 
such as Bordeaux in France or Napa in California. 
Furthermore, Lockshin and Rhodus (1993) and Schamel 
and Anderson (2003) argue that the existence of aggregated 
wine brands makes life easier for consumers, who would 
otherwise be faced with the need to pick out a bottle 
from among thousands.
The difficulty consumers have in distinguishing 
quality will mean that they do not discriminate much 
between individual brands, thus facilitating their 
proliferation to the point where there are thousands in 
the United States market, making them increasingly 
meaningless as a guide to wine quality. In this situation, 
it is not profitable for producers to invest individually in 
creating brand power. Only if they choose to collaborate 
will winemakers from a particular region be better placed 
to make these investments and generate a powerful 
collective brand, as, according to Aylward and Zanko 
(2006), California did in the 1970s.
Most other regions of origin, and particularly those 
in new entrant countries, will become aggregated brands 
by default, essentially because their low prices create 
a perception of lower quality, or at best because they 
suggest a different style of wine.
Brooks (2001 and 2003) bears this out by showing 
how countries operate as collective brands in the wine 
market, introducing a price differential that cannot 
be accounted for by any other variable. Thus, a wine 
from the Napa Valley in California will sell for twice 
as much as a wine of the same quality from Chile or 
Argentina. Similar findings have been obtained by 
Schamel (2000 and 2002) and Schamel and Anderson 
(2003) for Napa Valley wines relative to those from 
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Oregon, Washington, New Zealand, Australia, Chile, 
Argentina and South Africa.1
As is pointed out by Gergaud and Livat (2007) and 
Costanigro, McCluskey and Mittelhammer (2007), in 
building a reputation or a brand, or both, the objectives 
are always the same: to differentiate a region’s wines 
in order to enhance their perceived quality and thereby 
command a higher price.
1. Newcomers from the ends of the earth
According to Moguillansky, Salas and Cares (2006), 
the value for money strategy followed by the major 
Chilean exporters, consisting in offering medium-quality 
wines at prices lower than those charged by European 
producers, may have been an initial success, securing 
5% of the United States import market in 20 years, but 
it resulted in 80% of Chilean wines being concentrated 
in the low-price segment.
According to Van Tienhoven (2008), this association 
of Chilean wine with low prices is the only image that 
the bulk of United States consumers have been able to 
perceive, so that they have stereotyped it as an acceptable 
wine, but one suitable only for ordinary use. As Stein 
(2008) explains, this has become a real image trap for 
producers, preventing consumers from paying for the 
real quality of the product.
United States consumers lack the time and motivation 
to ascertain the individual quality of a wine. That is what 
reputations are for. According to Schamel and Anderson 
(2003), consumers use the stereotyped image of a 
product’s country of origin as a rule of thumb to guide 
their purchasing, especially in the case of cheap wines.
The market is continually reinforcing these 
stereotypes. Consumers see that in supermarkets and 
specialist outlets, Argentine, Chilean and South African 
wines are on the shelves where the cheap wines are 
stacked, while Californian wines, and especially French 
ones, are on the expensive shelves. Accustomed to 
associating quality directly with price, consumers learn 
to relate quality to origin. As Lockshin and Rhodus 
(1993) and Chaney (2000) point out, rightly or wrongly, 
 
1 The fact that Napa also has a better reputation than the states of 
Oregon and Washington rules out the possibility that its premium 
may be due to variations in labour costs relative to other countries, 
and shows how geographical brands can be circumscribed to just a 
single region in a country.
the country a wine comes from is ascribed a quality in 
its own right. In short, this is a veritable vicious circle 
for new entrants.
2. The sample
The sample of 14,284 red wines is from Wine Spectator. 
The low presence of Argentine, Chilean and South 
African wines in Wine Spectator reflects the reality of 
their penetration of the United States market, which only 
began in the 1990s. This is why the analysis begins with 
the 1997 vintage, as earlier than that it would not have 
been possible to arrive at econometric estimates of the 
parameters studied.
The sampling method used is similar to the cluster 
method, with a full selection of all its elements (wines). 
Each cluster is a region/country chosen a priori for its 
role in the price dynamic of this market. Burgundy, 
whose wines have traditionally had a strong presence in 
the United States market, embodies the French export 
strategy. The Napa and Sonoma valleys exemplify 
the successful ascending strategy of California, while 
Australia, Argentina, Chile and South Africa exemplify 
the strategy of those newcomer countries that have 
managed to improve their positioning in the United 
States over the past two decades.
The differing sample sizes that ensue for the various 
regions/countries (see table 1) reflect the actual weight 
of their wines in the United States market for acceptable 
to excellent wines (70 to 100 points) as covered by Wine 
Spectator. Variations in sample size between vintages 
reflect supply or demand factors, or both, an example 
being the volume goals of the industry plan in Australia.
The share of wines from newcomer countries (and 
from France) in the Wine Spectator universe is greater 
than their share of the actual United States market, where 
four of every 10 wines are from Napa and Sonoma, two 
are from the rest of California, one is from another state 
in the United States, and just three are imported. This 
is because countries tend to export their best wines.
Although selecting just some of the competing 
regions/countries means that the sample is skewed in 
favour of new entrant wines (four out of every 10 wines 
are from these countries), the inclusion of all wines from 
each region/country selected means that these retain their 
original proportions, allowing realistic comparisons to be 
made between their quality averages and proportions of 
outstanding wines; it also provides robust sample sizes 
for the econometric estimates.
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The average price and quality indicators in table 2 show 
that consumers’ willingness to pay is heavily influenced 
not so much by the objective quality of a wine as by the 
reputation or image, or both, of its country of origin, 
with French wines fetching the highest price relative 
to their average quality, which was actually lower than 
that of their main competitor, California, and similar to 
that of new entrants, such as Chile, in the late 1990s.
This can be seen more plainly in the evolution of 
the price per unit of average quality ratio for French 
TABLE 1
Sample used, by country and vintage
Vintage
Country or region of origin
Argentina Australia California Chile Burgundy South Africa Vintage total
1997 76 358 1 018 191 544 107 2 294
1999 114 514 1 102 219 575 115 2 639
2001 120 624 1 217 250 339 212 2 762
2004 328 674 1 159 234 360 236 2 991
2005 358 622 1 471 284 609 254 3 598
Country total 996 2 792 5 967 1 178 2 427 924 14 284
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of data from Wine Spectator.
Note: Each value in the table represents the annual number of red wines from each country/region used in this study. Most wine is sold 
two or three years after the year of the vintage.
III
The stylized facts: an interpretation
TABLE 2
Evolution of the price and quality of wines  
from six countries of the world, 1997-2005
Vintage Indicator
Country or region of origin










































































































Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of data from Wine Spectator.
Note: The values in the table are the annual country averages for each indicator. Most wine is sold two or three years after the year of the 
vintage. The Wine Spectator rating runs from 50 points (very poor) to 100 points (outstanding).
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wines, which was still three times that of wines from 
new entrant countries and one and a half times that 
of Californian wines in 2005, at the end of the period 
analysed. According to Heslop, Cray and Armenakyan 
(2009), nothing seems to have changed in the mindset 
of United States consumers, for whom French wine 
continued to be synonymous with excellence.
When the evidence is analysed more carefully, 
however, it becomes clear that something began to change 
for French wines in the late 1990s, with their price/quality 
ratio dropping sharply from 0.9 to 0.68 between 1997 
and 2001, and thereby converging towards the rising 
ratio of Californian wine, suggesting a weakening both 
of their brand and of their price premium.
This decline was only temporary, however. From 
2001, the French reacted by steadily raising the mediocre 
average starting quality of their wines, until they attained 
the remarkable level of 90 points in 2005. Achieving this 
meant steadily increasing the proportion of outstanding 
wines awarded 90 points and over to 44%, more than any 
competitor, while at the same time drastically curtailing 
exports of poor-quality wines, as can be seen in table 3.
This change was not down to chance. The most 
plausible explanation is the growing difficulty the 
French were having in continuing to sell what were 
merely acceptable wines at two or three times the price 
of equivalent New World wines. The analysis by Barco, 
Navarro and Langreo (2005) supports this hypothesis, 
noting that the French share of United States wine 
imports dropped from 28% to 14% between 1993 and 
2003, largely owing to the entry of Australian wines.
Cox and Bridwell (2007) round out the hypothesis 
by showing how the French successfully repositioned 
their wines in the highest-quality segments from 1999 
on, raising their prices by up to 100% and at the same 
time pulling out of the lower-quality segments where 
their cost structure did not allow them to compete.
Thus, the final average price/quality ratio of 0.99 
for French wines needs to be analysed with care and 
always in the awareness that it is circumscribed to very 
good or outstanding wines, a segment where wines from 
France still retain their glamour. In most of the market, 
however, French wines are losing brand power relative 
to Californian ones, along with their ability to command 
a price premium.
The initial paradox in the situation of French wine in 
1997, with its low average quality and excellent reputation, 
is consistent with the theories of Tirole (1996). A high 
level of collective prestige creates irresistible incentives 
for some producers, distributors or both to sell wines of 
middling quality at high prices. This happened in the 
late 1990s in the United States, as reported by Landon 
and Smith (1997 and 1998).
According to Roberts and Reagans (2007), it is very 
likely that the gradually increasing transparency of the 
wine market (greater disclosure of ratings) made it less 
tolerable for consumers to keep paying more for poor 
French wines than for better New World ones.
1. The marketing short cut
Building a reputation like that of France, which dominated 
the United States market for about a century, is a process 
that it is practically impossible to replicate. As Hadj and 
Nauges (2007) explain, this reputation was shaped from 
1855 onward by means of strict quality rules that endure 
today, and through image associations that penetrated 
deeply into the outlook of the country’s consumers.
From Hollywood cinema, with soldiers savouring a 
French wine in the din of the battle for Europe, to mass 
TABLE 3
Number of outstanding wines in the Californian market, by country, 1997-2005
Vintage
1997 1999 2001 2004 2005
N>90 Percentage N>90 Percentage N>90 Percentage N>90 Percentage N>90 Percentage
Argentina 3 4 18 16 18 15 62 19 57 16
Australia 70 20 98 19 137 22 228 34 246 40
California 267 26 200 18 275 23 336 29 377 24
Chile 9 5 17 8 30 12 30 13 40 21
France (Burgundy) 83 15 104 18 82 25 122 34 268 44
South Africa 2 2 12 11 31 15 51 22 86 34
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of data from Wine Spectator.
Note: The figures in each cell show the number (N) and percentage of wines from each country scoring 90 or over in the Wine Spectator 
classification.
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tourism to French castles and vineyards, where Americans 
adopted the language and experience of wine, image 
associations that projected French brand strength were 
created (Keller, 1993), the result being that consumers 
would pay more for the experience of consuming the 
country’s wines than their objective quality merited.
It is a myth that the rising California brand was 
constructed quickly. Brosnan (2006) reports that it took 
the best producers about 30 years to attain the quality 
and consistency of French wines, but almost a century to 
adapt the best of their tradition to a unique and glamorous 
cultural setting in the Napa Valley. This meant that their 
best wines were able to generate emotional benefits more 
like those of French ones, but seemingly only within the 
United States market.
When Australian wines made their entry in the 1990s, 
they were able to adapt global technology and rapidly 
caught up with the quality of French and Californian 
wines. The stumbling block was the lack of a winegrowing 
history, and the method chosen to remedy this was an 
unconventional marketing campaign linking Australian 
wines with concepts such as straightforwardness, 
friendliness and honesty, in contrast to the snobbish 
associations of French wine.
They achieved a partial success. According to Heslop, 
Cray and Armenakyan (2009), the merit of fun, cheap 
wines (such as Yellow Trail) was to attract consumers 
who were tired of specialized criticism. Although the 
“fun” stereotype of Australian wines generated volume, 
it did not result in glamour or in prices reflecting their 
quality, and nor did it at all enhance their brand power 
relative to California.
Table 3 shows the number and proportion of 
outstanding wines (over 90 points on the Wine Spectator 
scale) produced each year by the winegrowers of each 
region/country.
A comparison of the proportions confirms the pattern 
of reputation abuse, excessive image dominance or both 
that has already been touched upon.
While the proportion of outstanding Australian 
wines rose from 20% in 1997 to 40% in 2005, the figure 
for California fell from 26% to 24%. The Australians 
have shown a greater commitment to quality than the 
successful Californian producers, whose indicator ranks 
about equal with those of countries with a low collective 
commitment such as Argentina and Chile.
These findings confirm the misgivings of Shapiro 
(1983) concerning the stagnation and erosion of average 
quality that can result from a successful collective 
reputation. Despite producing the world’s largest number 
of outstanding wines, the Napa Valley has drawn in an 
enormous influx of free riders looking to charge a price 
premium purely by claiming location in the Valley. 
Benjamin and Podolny (1999) estimate that 50% of 
bottles labelled as being from Napa are actually from 
other valleys, this being made possible by the laxity of 
United States rules of origin legislation.
2. Critical mass
Production of a large absolute number of outstanding wines 
translates directly into prices that are proportional to the 
reputation of the region concerned, and thus leverages 
the image of iconic countries or regions.
California may have a low indicator of collective 
commitment (and lower average quality than competitors 
like Australia), but its larger absolute number of 
outstanding wines (377 versus 246) and its rising reputation 
have assured its dominance of the high-priced segment 
of the market, sending out an important signal of quality 
for all its wines. As table 2 shows, France continues to 
command extraordinary prices with a smaller but still 
considerable number of outstanding wines.
According to Easingwood (2007), consumers use 
a region or country’s mass of high-priced wines to infer 
the quality of the rest of its wines. This critical mass 
not only interacts with reputation, but actually creates 
it. It is currently helping California more than France, 
which can no longer project its brand influence on to 
its lower-quality wines.
The change in brand power in most of the United 
States market has been mainly a matter of changing 
images. California has been supplanting France, much 
as Pepsi has been overtaking Coca-Cola among the 
younger generations: it is cooler. Quality does not 
seem to be such a big issue and consumers do not much 
understand it. According to Costanigro, McCluskey 
and Goemans (2009), the exact mechanism whereby a 
reputation emerges and is converted into higher prices 
is not yet fully understood.
To sum up, in public policy terms the findings of the 
descriptive analysis call into question the effectiveness 
of marketing and investment in quality as quick methods 
of freeing producers from the country brand trap they 
are caught in. As tables 2 and 3 highlight, there are no 
short cuts when it comes to solving this problem: the 
inertia of the brand image created by France, and later 
by California, makes it very intractable.
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In most empirical studies relating wine price to quality, 
variants of the following equation are estimated:
 lnpi = β0 + β1 lnxi + β2 lnYi + β3Dj (1)
where pi is the price of bottle i, xi is the individual 
sensory or “objective” quality score awarded to the 
wine after a blind tasting, and Yi is a vector of control 
variables, which include the age of the wine, the amount 
produced and the individual reputation or brand of the 
producer or vineyard. Price-quality elasticity is given 
by the coefficient β1, since the specification is double-
logarithmic.
Landon and Smith (1997 and 1998) show how leaving 
out regional reputation or wine origin variables leads 
to overestimation of the importance of quality in price-
setting, as their impact on this is several times greater.
Following the same approach, Schamel (2000), 
Schamel and Anderson (2003) and Costanigro, McCluskey 
and Goemans (2009) incorporate as predictors of wine 
prices not just the reputation of the producer (individual 
reputation) but also the reputation of the wine’s country 
or region of origin (collective reputation).
To calculate the (percentage) premium or penalty 
in the price of a country’s wines relative to the price of 
a benchmark region or country’s wines, a dichotomous 
variable Dj is incorporated into equation (1), taking the 
value 1 if the wine is from region/country j and 0 if it 
is not. β3 will be positive (negative) and statistically 
significant when the reputation of the region/country as 
a wine producer is better (worse) than that of the region/
country used as the benchmark.
In this study, the region/country used as the 
benchmark is California. Thus, the absolute value of 
β3 is the percentage premium or penalty (collective 
reputation) of the region/country’s wine relative to 
Californian wine.
Models like the one expressed in equation (1) can 
be used to measure, separately, how much the reputation 
of the country of origin and the actual quality of the wine 
influence consumers’ willingness to pay.
1. Estimating the model
The data for estimating equation (1) come from five 
cross-sectional series reported by Wine Spectator for the 
1997, 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2005 vintages. These series 
include: market price (in each year’s current dollars), 
brand, number of cases sold, age, sensory quality score, 
and country and region of origin of each bottle.
Age is obtained by subtracting the year of the vintage 
from the year in which the wine was rated. This variable 
would be expected to have a coefficient with a positive 
sign. Letting a wine age is an investment decision: this 
option is chosen when the increase in the selling price 
resulting from the expected increase in quality exceeds 
the costs (including capital costs) of storing the product.
It is also to be expected that the amount of wine 
produced will have a negative sign as an explanatory 
variable in vector Yi, in equation (1): consumers sense 
that to produce large amounts of a particular wine, a 
vineyard will have to buy in grapes from other estates, 
thus losing control over the quality of the product.
Schamel (2000) and Costanigro, McCluskey and 
Mittelhammer (2007) measure a producer’s reputation 
by the number of outstanding wines (those scoring 90 
or over on the Wine Spectator scale) produced by the 
vineyard in the last two years.
2. Findings
Table 4 presents the outcome of five cross-sectional 
regressions used to analyse the relationship between 
price, quality rating, individual reputation and collective 
reputation by region/country in the wine market. Given 
that price and the other non-dichotomous variables 
are all expressed in log terms, the coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities.
The five regressions show price-quality elasticity 
coefficients that are statistically significant, positive in sign 
and of the expected magnitude, within the range of the 
findings reported by Brooks (2001) and Schamel (2000).
The results also indicate that, contrary to what 
Gibbs, Tapia and Warzynski (2009) expected, price-
quality elasticity has held fairly steady over time, ranging 
between 2.7 and 4.5.
Assuming a best case scenario in which price-quality 
elasticity was 4.5 and Chilean winemakers increased 
average quality on the Wine Spectator scale by one 
percentage point, approaching the quality of Napa Valley 
wines (not an easy task), the market price of Chilean 
wines would rise by an average of 4.5%, i.e., just US$ 1, 
IV 
Empirical model and findings
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TABLE 4
Evolution of price-quality elasticity and the country of origin  
premium (penalty) in the United States wine market, 1997-2005
Variable
Vintage





































































































Adjusted R2 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.58
Observations 1 842 2 639 2 646 2 881 3 407
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of data from Wine Spectator.
Note: The values in the cells show the parameters estimated for each variable in cross-sectional regressions, one for each year. The quality 
variable is the score awarded to the producer’s wine in the Wine Spectator classification. Prestige or individual reputation is equivalent to the 
number of wines with the producer’s brand scoring over 90 points in the classification. All variables other than the dichotomous variables 
by country are measured in natural logarithms. Prestige or the country brand is obtained by estimating the coefficient of a dichotomous 
variable taking the value 1 if the wine is produced in the country and 0 if it is not. The numbers in parentheses are Student’s t-statistics.
from US$ 22 to US$ 23 a bottle. Thus, increasing the 
average price of a region’s wines by improving their 
quality is too slow a process.
Where the evolution of the France and California 
brands is concerned, United States consumers were 
prepared to pay 57% more for French wines than for 
Californian wines of the same quality in the case of 
the 1997 vintage, but their willingness to pay this price 
premium quickly diminished, something that can be 
clearly seen in the coefficients of the France brand: 
starting in 2001, the French premium first disappeared 
and then became a penalty, until by 2005 consumers were 
paying 22% less for these wines than for Californian 
wines of the same quality. This reveals the decline in the 
country’s brand power compared to that of California.
The possibility that France may retain brand power 
in the small segment of outstanding wines cannot be 
ruled out and is suggested by the descriptive data, but 
this is hard to prove econometrically owing to the small 
quantity and limited quality variance of wines in this 
segment, and exceeds the scope of this study.
Argentina, Chile and South Africa have not improved 
their brand power at all, and their wines are subject to a 
fairly similar pricing penalty. In particular, consumers 
have been penalizing Chilean wines with a discount 
(in dollars per bottle) that increased from 34% in 1997 
to 56% in 2005, as the country brand coefficients in 
table 4 show.
The decline in the brand power of Chilean wines 
has been magnified in relative terms by the rise in the 
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brand power of California to the detriment of France. 
If this is corrected for by comparing the Chile data with 
those of France as a benchmark, it transpires that the 
price penalty for Chilean wines compared to French ones 
of the same quality actually fell from 96% to 78% (this 
is obtained by adding up the absolute values of each 
country’s coefficients).
The results in table 4 also reveal that the price 
penalty for Australia was just 10% less than Chile’s in 
2005. This finding should not be interpreted as meaning 
that the Australian investment in marketing and quality 
was pointless; it only illustrates the difficulty of gaining 
market power when competing with strong reputations.
Considering that Australia sells three times as 
much in volume terms and commands an average price 
10% higher than Chile’s for a given quality, Australian 
wines have more country brand power than their Chilean 
competitors.
3. Price-quality elasticity by country
The price-quality elasticity obtained is really an average 
of the price-quality elasticities of the different countries 
analysed.
With a view to ascertaining whether this parameter 
has evolved similarly or differently from country to 
country, the equation (1) model was reestimated, but 
this time with separate specifications by country. The 
country brand variable disappears from the equation.
If, as Gibbs, Tapia and Warzynski (2009) claim, 
the globalization of the wine market has caused price-
quality elasticity to rise with time, the importance of 
country brands ought to have diminished: wines should 
increasingly be assessed on their individual quality and 
less on their region or country of origin.
However, figure 1 shows that this elasticity has 
only clearly risen in the case of France; for California, 
on the other hand, price-quality elasticity has declined as 
the region has enhanced its reputation and brand power.
In the present study, this finding is largely explained 
by the shift in reputation and brand power between the 
two places of origin. Consumers do not go to great lengths 
to check the quality of Californian wine: its growing 
reputation suffices for them to pay the asking price. 
Conversely, the higher prices of French wines make it 
worthwhile for consumers to incur the opportunity cost 
of checking their prices.
The other countries analysed present a modest 
upward trend, which is good news for the new entrants, 
but it is much too slight for us to infer that consumers 
are choosing on the basis of quality: it is still country 
brands they go by.
FIGURE 1
Price-quality elasticities by country, 1997-2005
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of data from Wine Spectator.
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4. Explaining country image
The specifications analysed in table 4 and figure 1 
monitor the evolution of the brand power of the various 
competing countries, with a negative finding for New 
World wines: because of their weak country brands, 
improving individual quality is too slow a way of 
increasing the average prices of their wines.
The coefficient that measures a region’s brand power 
does not reveal how far this is determined by the actual 
(sensory or objective) quality of its wines and how far 
by its image alone. The two concepts are intertwined 
and hard to disentangle.
In an effort to explain what the country brand 
concept means, an additional specification is added to 
the model proposed in equation (1): the dichotomous 
variable representing each region/country is replaced by 
the number of wines produced by a country’s winemakers 
that are rated outstanding (scoring 90 or over) on the 
Wine Spectator scale.2
2 Besides being intuitively reasonable as a way of explaining a 
country’s prestige or brand, the critical mass or number of outstanding 
wines is an econometrically attractive variable: constant for a given 
Country prestige becomes a variable. In other words, 
it varies between countries depending on the number of 
outstanding wines each one produces and is constant for 
all a country’s wines. Thus, as table 3 shows, a bottle of 
wine in the 1997 sample will take one of the following 
values: 3, 70, 267, 9, 83 or 2 depending on whether it 
is from Argentina, Australia, California, Chile, France 
or South Africa, respectively.
With this way of recasting the model, clearly, the 
assumption is that the reputation of a country which only 
produces nine outstanding wines, like Chile in 1997, 
cannot but be very low compared to that of a region 
like California which produces 267. The objective is 
a different one: if the goodness of fit of the model and 
the statistical significance of this new variable can be 
demonstrated, the results will serve to show the critical 
mass of outstanding wines that a new entrant country 
needs to have in order for the prestige thus acquired to 
rub off on the rest of its wines.
country’s wines, but differing greatly between countries, it covaries 
with wine price and has a low correlation with the other explanatory 
variables of the model.
TABLE 5
Evolution of price-quality elasticity and price-country  
brand elasticity in the United States wine market
Variable
Vintage































































Adjusted R2 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.62
Observations 1 842 2 639 2 646 2 881 3 407
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of data from Wine Spectator.
Note: the values in the cells show the parameters estimated for each variable in cross-sectional regressions, one for each year. Individual 
quality is measured by the score awarded to the producer’s wine in the Wine Spectator classification. The individual prestige and country 
prestige variables equate to the number of wines from the producer and from all the country’s producers, respectively, scoring over 90 points 
in this classification each year. All the variables are measured in natural logarithms. The values in parentheses are the Student’s t-statistic.
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The findings reported in table 5 show that price-
country prestige elasticity, i.e., the sensitivity of wine 
prices to the number of outstanding wines produced by 
winemakers in the producer’s country of origin, was not 
only statistically significant for all the vintages analysed, 
but rose from about 0.1 in 1997 to 0.25 in 2005.
The price of wine in the United States market, heavily 
determined by image effects predating the vintages of 
the year 2000 (the period of French predominance), 
would come to acquire a larger quality component: 
the critical mass of outstanding wines. Image would 
operate through this.
Considering that for the 2005 vintage California 
had a critical mass of 377 outstanding wines and Chile 
only 40 (as shown in table 3), it can be concluded that 
Californian wines, on average, cost 213% = 0.253 x 
843% as much as Chilean ones, a result that is in line 
with previous results shown in table 4.
An increase in the critical mass of outstanding wines 
not only raises the average quality of a country’s wines, 
but also leverages its image, increasing the average price 
of all its wines. If Chilean winemakers were to double 
their output of outstanding wines from 40 in the 2005 
vintage to 80, then, all other things being equal, the 
average price of their wines would rise by some 25% 
= 0.253 x 100%, i.e., from US$ 22 to just over US$ 28 
a bottle on average.
These findings show how, through exposure to 
specialized professional criticism, a country producing a 
large quantity of outstanding wines sends out a powerful 
signal of quality to the market, enhancing perceptions 
and prices for all its wines.
V 
Conclusions and limitations
On the basis of data for red wines in the United States 
market, this study has set out to evaluate empirically 
how important individual product quality is in a wine’s 
market price as against the collective reputation of its 
region or country of origin. Another objective has been 
to suggest public policy approaches that can help new 
entrant countries such as Argentina and Chile to enhance 
the positioning of their country brand more effectively.
The estimates of the hedonic price model reveal 
that country brands still exert a considerable effect on 
the prices of all wines, something that a new entrant 
country such as Chile, subject as it is to a price penalty 
that has remained almost unchanged since the late 1990s, 
cannot easily remedy.
Although the increasing critical scrutiny to which 
producers have been exposed has made the wine market 
more transparent than it was in the 1990s, this has only 
partially eroded the role of reputations; thus, although 
France’s reputation has declined as a result, the same 
has not happened with California’s.
In estimating the model by region/country, the 
findings of this study have shown that, with the exception 
of France, price-quality elasticity has proved stable over 
time rather than rising as suggested by Gibbs, Tapia and 
Warzynski (2009), confirming once again that the market 
continues to judge the quality of wines more on their 
collective reputation than on their individual quality, as 
would happen in a transparent market.
The message for wines from new entrant countries 
such as Chile is straightforward: it is not possible to 
improve a country brand with a “value for money” 
concept. Despite its initial effectiveness as a penetration 
strategy, this has equated to devaluing the reputation of 
good Chilean wines in advance.
It is extraordinarily difficult to convince the wine 
market to appreciate new entrants. The findings of this 
research reveal that producers from France formerly, and 
those from California today, have been able to deploy 
their superior brand power and command higher prices 
even with an average quality that may be lower than 
that of new entrants. Their power has consisted, and 
still consists, in a strong collective image.
This study has also revealed that when the market 
is opaque, the average quality of the dominant country 
brand has a natural tendency to stagnate or even decline, 
owing to the entry of free-riding producers who use the 
good reputation of their region of origin to sell low-quality 
wines for high prices. For new entrant countries such as 
Argentina and Chile, however, hoping that a dominant 
collective reputation may decline for this reason is a 
slow and uncertain approach.
Although, as Roberts and Reagans (2007) point 
out, the wine ratings of specialist journals such as Wine 
Spectator have helped to increase transparency in the market, 
consumers’ relationship with these publications is not 
direct but is affected by their price and is subject to a lag.
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This explains why regions such as California 
can carry on dominating the bulk of the market, and 
commanding a price premium, by producing a large 
mass of outstanding wines, even if their average regional 
quality is lower than that of other contenders. It is the 
absolute critical mass of outstanding wines rather than 
the proportion of outstanding wines that creates a signal 
of quality or brand halo around all a country’s wines in 
the minds of consumers.
The results obtained in this study reveal that 
increasing the critical mass of outstanding wines 
(scoring 90 or over in the Wine Spectator classification) 
enhances a new entrant country’s reputation, and thereby 
strengthens the average price-quality ratio of its wines, 
more quickly than does raising average quality. A 
country’s collective reputation or brand acts as a public 
good, and the resulting premium or penalty extends to 
all the region/country’s wines.
Consequently, rather than using marketing in an 
effort to change the narrative through image association, 
it would be more fruitful to strongly encourage and 
reward (subsidize) outstanding quality in Chilean and 
Argentine wines until a substantial critical mass has 
been attained. There will be no solution to the country 
brand problem until these new entrant countries produce 
a critical mass of outstanding wines, this being the factor 
that will ultimately determine whether their producers 
benefit from a good collective image or reputation.
Limitations of the study
The Wine Spectator data present some shortcomings. One 
stumbling block in these and other investigations is that it 
is not entirely clear how Wine Spectator arrives at prices, 
and aggregate volumes by country are not that precise. 
This is made up for, in our view, by the opportunity to 
conduct causal analyses of the importance of country 
brands and individual quality in determining prices.
(Original: Spanish)
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